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Abstract 
 
Papers published about the need for a theoretical core in the information systems (IS) 
discipline can be characterized as either nature-of-the-discipline commentaries or logic-
of-the-core commentaries.  The former articulate the authors’ views on those 
phenomena that research in the IS discipline ought to investigate.  The latter scrutinize 
some of the logic that underlies arguments made by those who either support or reject 
the need for a theoretical core.  Unfortunately, nature-of-the-discipline commentaries are 
unlikely to help clarify or resolve fundamental issues that underpin the debate.  Too often 
they are based on idiosyncratic views that are difficult to either justify or refute.  Logic-of-
the-core commentaries, however, lay bare the arguments made by the protagonists so 
they can be evaluated.  In this paper, I examine the logic-of-the-core arguments made by 
Lyytinen and King (2004) and evaluate their validity. 
 
Keywords:  Information Systems, disciplinary identity, disciplinary legitimacy, theoretical 
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Introduction 
 
Many papers have now been published relating to the debate about whether the 
Information Systems (IS) discipline needs a theoretical core TPF2FPT.  Elsewhere I have 
characterized these papers as either nature-of-the-discipline commentaries or logic-of-
the-core commentaries (Weber, 2006, pp. 294-296).  The former present the authors’ 
views on the nature and scope of the IS discipline and the important questions that the 
                                                 
TP
1
PT I am indebted to my colleague John Crossley, Professor of Logic at Monash University, for 
comments on earlier versions of this paper.  All errors that exist in the paper, however, are my 
responsibility alone.  I am also indebted to Kalle Lyytinen and John King for the intellectual 
stimulus and their goodwill in an exchange that has now extended over many years. 
TP
2
PT See, e.g., King and Lyytinen (2006) for a selection of published papers and commentaries on 
these papers. 
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authors believe research within the discipline ought to address.  The latter present the 
authors’ analyses of some of the logic underlying the arguments made about whether 
having a theoretical core will clarify the IS discipline’s identity and/or enhance its 
academic legitimacy. 
 
The vast majority of papers published on the debate are nature-of-the-discipline 
commentaries; few provide logic-of-the-core analyses.  Nonetheless, elsewhere I have 
argued that nature-of-the-discipline commentaries have limited usefulness as a means of 
resolving the debate about whether the IS discipline needs a theoretical core (Weber, 
2006, p. 295).  Such papers also provide interesting insights into the authors’ views 
about those phenomena that ought to be the focus of research within the IS discipline.  
Aside from the quality of the rhetoric they manifest (and perhaps the extent to which the 
authors’ views are congruent with one’s own views), however, few bases exist for 
choosing one view over another.  In sharp contrast, logic-of-the-core commentaries bring 
the protagonists in the debate face to face.  Each such commentary has the rationale 
underpinning its arguments surfaced and scrutinized. 
 
In this paper, I focus on one of the few papers that addresses logic-of-the-core 
arguments–namely, Lyytinen and King (2004).  Their paper, which was published in this 
journal, also provides a nature-of-the-discipline commentary.  Nonetheless, in some 
parts of their paper they commit to a logic-of-the-core argument, for which as a scholar 
(and a long-time participant in the debate about the need for a theoretical core in the IS 
discipline) I am grateful.  Their argument allows us to engage directly in determining 
where we agree and where we disagree.  In this regard, the quality of our rhetoric 
provides us with poor shelter in our affrays. 
 
One more time!  Theoretical cores and academic legitimacy 
 
Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) use the following syllogismTPF3FPT to address the matter of 
theoretical cores and academic legitimacy in a discipline: 
 
1. All disciplines that have a theoretical core have legitimacy as an 
academic discipline. 
2. The discipline of physics has a theoretical core. 
3. Therefore the discipline of physics has legitimacy as an academic 
discipline. 
 
Given the major premise that all disciplines that have a theoretical core have legitimacy 
as an academic discipline and the minor premise that physics has a theoretical core, the 
conclusion that physics has legitimacy as an academic discipline is valid in logic.  Of 
course, whether the major premise and minor premise are true is another matter.  
Assuming they are, however, the conclusion is true. 
 
As an aside (but a point of precision), Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) claim in relation 
to the above syllogism:  “The argument thus far follows a valid form (modus ponens).”  
They are correct in saying that the argument follows a valid form.  They are incorrect, 
however, in saying that the argument uses modus ponens.  Because they have used a 
                                                 
TP
3
PT Note, in an attempt to make my arguments clearer, I have stated Lyytinen and King’s 
formalizations of their “syllogisms” as English text. 
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quantifier in their major premise (“all disciplines”), modus ponens does not apply.  
Instead, the argument is valid because it is based upon a categorical syllogism. TPF4FPT 
 
Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) then use the following syllogism, which they call a 
“complementary syllogism” in relation to their first syllogism: 
 
1b. All disciplines that do not have a theoretical core do not have legitimacy 
as an academic discipline. 
2b. The discipline of information systems does not have a theoretical core. 
3b. Therefore the discipline of information systems does not have legitimacy 
as an academic discipline. 
 
Again, the conclusion that the IS discipline does not have legitimacy as an academic 
discipline is true, if the major premise and minor premise are also true.  Nonetheless, 
Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) comment:  “The problem, however, comes with 
syllogisms [sic] (1b), (2b), and (3b), which the core theory assumes–called the logical 
fallacy of denying the consequent.  This suggests that a lack of legitimacy results from 
the lack of a strong theoretical core, and thus from the denial of the antecedent 
(theoretical core, modus ponens)TPF5FPT the denial of the consequence (legitimacy) can be 
inferred.  The chain (1b), (2b), and (3b) cannot be entailed from (1), (2), and (3), and is a 
logical fallacy.  From the absence of something one can derive everything, which is 
tantamount to nothing.” 
 
I have four concerns about Lyytinen and King’s arguments.  The following subsections 
address each of them. 
 
Confusion about Necessary versus Sufficient Condition 
 
To evaluate the validity of Lyytinen and King’s syllogisms, it is important to understand 
the concepts of “necessary condition” and “sufficient condition” in logic. 
 
In logic, the expression: 
 
p ⇒ q 
 
is read, “p only if q,” or “if p then q,” or “p implies q.”  In this expression, q is a necessary 
condition for p.  In other words, condition q must always hold whenever p holds.  Other 
conditions might also have to hold before p holds.  Whatever these conditions, however, 
if p holds, the condition q must always hold.  For instance, the condition “person is a 
female” is a necessary condition for the condition “person is a mother.”  Whenever a 
person is a mother, it is necessary that the person be a female.  On the other hand, 
being a mother is not a necessary condition for a person to be a female.  Some females 
do not have children, and thus they are not mothers. 
 
In logic, the expression: 
                                                 
TP
4
PT Modus ponens is also known as a hypothetical syllogism, and hypothetical syllogisms do not 
use quantifiers (like “all x” or “for every x”) in their major premise.  See the entry “syllogism” in 
The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001, at http://www.bartleby.com/65/sy/syllogis.html. 
TP
5
PT As per footnote 4, Lyytinen and King are again incorrect in saying they have used modus 
ponens. 
Reach and Grasp in the Debate over the IS Core/Weber 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 11, pp. 703-713/October 2006 706 
 
p ⇐ q 
 
is read, “p if q,” or “if q then p,” or “q implies p.”  In this expression, q is a sufficient 
condition for p.  In other words, if q holds, then p will hold, but it is important to note that 
p might still hold even when q does not hold.  For instance, the condition “person has 
been beheaded” is a sufficient condition for the condition “person is dead.”  Nonetheless, 
a person might be dead for reasons other than being beheaded.  In this regard, being 
beheaded is not a necessary condition for a person to be dead. 
 
Finally, in logic, the expression: 
 
p ⇔ q 
 
is read, “p if and only if q.”  In other words, p implies q and q implies p.  For instance, 
assume p is the condition “month with less than 30 days” and q is the condition “month 
is February.”  If condition “month with less than 30 days holds,” it is necessary that the 
condition “month is February” hold.  Similarly, if the condition “month is February” holds, 
it is sufficient for the condition “month with less than 30 days” to hold. 
 
Using these notions, Lyytinen and King’s major premise (1) is that having legitimacy as 
an academic discipline is a necessary condition for the academic discipline to have a 
theoretical core.  Alternatively, it is that having a theoretical core is a sufficient condition 
for the academic discipline to have legitimacy.  It is important to understand that this 
premise, taken on its own, entails: 
 
• Whenever a discipline has a theoretical core, it will also have academic 
legitimacy. 
• A discipline might have academic legitimacy even though it does not have a 
theoretical core. 
 
I will leave it to other scholars who argue for the importance of having a theoretical core 
in the IS discipline to evaluate whether Lyytinen and King’s major premise is a true 
statement of their own position.  From my perspective, however, Lyytinen and King’s 
major premise is a false statement of the position of at least some scholars who argue 
for the importance of having a theoretical core in the IS discipline.  In this regard, I see 
three premises underlying the arguments made by these scholars. 
 
First, I believe that some who argue for the importance of a theoretical core contend that 
having a theoretical core is a necessary condition for academic legitimacy.  In other 
words, their major premise is the converse of Lyytinen and King’s major premise.  Note 
that this converse premise, taken on its own, entails: 
 
• Whenever a discipline has academic legitimacy, it will also have a theoretical 
core (see also Figure 1, upper right-hand quadrant). 
• A discipline can have a theoretical core, but it might not have academic 
legitimacy. TPF6FPT 
                                                 
TP
6
PT Following this line of reasoning, it might be helpful to think of attaining academic legitimacy as a 
two-step process.  First, a core for a discipline must be determined, but the discovery of a core 
does not mean that academic legitimacy will be attained immediately.  Moreover, the existence of 
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Figure 1:  Possible Relations between Having Academic Legitimacy (AL) 
and Having a Theoretical Core (TC). 
 
Second, I believe some who argue for the need for a theoretical core in the IS discipline 
would make a stronger-form argument.  Specifically, I believe they would contend that 
having a theoretical core is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for a discipline to 
have academic legitimacy.  In other words, if an academic discipline has legitimacy, it 
must have a theoretical core.  Moreover, the existence of a theoretical core is sufficient 
for an academic discipline to have legitimacy.  In short, academic legitimacy cannot exist 
without a theoretical core and vice versa. 
 
Third, I believe some proponents of the need for a theoretical core in the IS discipline, 
myself included, would contend that having a theoretical core is neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient condition for academic legitimacy.  Instead, they would argue that having a 
theoretical core is a necessary condition for having a clear disciplinary identity, not 
academic legitimacy.  Whether having a clear disciplinary identity is a necessary or a 
sufficient condition for academic legitimacy is itself an important issue for debate. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
a core does not guarantee that academic legitimacy will emerge eventually (other conditions must 
also be satisfied).  Second, the process would then continue by arguing that some disciplines (but 
not all disciplines) that have a core then go on to attain academic legitimacy.  If a discipline does 
not have a core in the first place, however, it will never go on to attain academic legitimacy. 
AL
AL
AL
AL
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC(x) ⇒ AL(x)
¬AL(x) ⇒ ¬TC(x)
AL(x) ⇒ TC(x)
¬TC(x) ⇒ ¬AL(x)
AL(x) ⇒ ¬TC(x)
TC(x) ⇒ ¬AL(x)
No conclusion can be
drawn here
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Inconsistencies Between Statements and Premises 
 
Lyytinen and King make conflicting statements about the arguments advanced by 
scholars who support the need for a theoretical core in the IS discipline.  For instance, at 
one point in their paper, they state (p. 223):  “The central question is whether the IS 
field’s legitimacy rests on the presence of a theoretical core.  In order to be convincing, 
the argument that legitimacy can be gained only through the possession of a theoretical 
core must be both valid and sound” (my emphasis).  In logic, their use of the phrase 
“only through” means that they are stating that “the possession of a theoretical core” is a 
necessary condition for “legitimacy to be gained.”  Their syllogism, (1), (2), and (3) 
above, however, is not a correct statement of this argument (instead, they are arguing in 
this syllogism that the possession of a theoretical core is a sufficient condition for 
legitimacy). 
 
Subsequently, they state (p. 225) in relation to their first syllogism:  “Premise (1) implies 
an inductive generalization:  all academic fields with a strong theoretic core are found to 
be legitimate, and that no legitimate field can be found that lacks a theoretic core.”  Such 
an inductive generalization would require empirical data on which to base it.  Moreover, 
this is a new interpretation of their premise, and they are now making a different 
argument from the one they made earlier in their paper (p. 223).  Moreover, it is 
inconsistent with the statement they make in the previous paragraph (p. 225):  “However, 
under these circumstances, the argument that a theoretical core is necessary for 
legitimacy cannot be established deductively, and can be made only by empirical 
induction” (my emphasis).  This statement is true, but it does not follow from their first 
syllogism.  Again, according to their first syllogism, legitimacy is necessary for a 
theoretical core and not vice versa.  To turn the arrow of implication around requires an 
inductive argument. 
 
In relation to premise (1), Lyytinen and King state (p. 225), “…it is much easier to test the 
premise by finding an example of a field that is legitimate, but that has no theoretic core.”  
This statement again reflects their confusion over the difference between a necessary 
condition and a sufficient condition.  According to premise (1), academic legitimacy is a 
necessary condition (not a sufficient condition) for possession of a theoretical core.  In 
other words, having academic legitimacy does not guarantee the existence of a 
theoretical core (other conditions might also have to be satisfied before a theoretical core 
exists).  Contrary to Lyytinen and King’s claim, therefore, “finding an example of a field 
that is legitimate, but that has no theoretic core” does not “test the premise.”  Instead, to 
test it would require finding a field that has a theoretical core but does not have 
academic legitimacy as an academic discipline. 
 
Elsewhere in their paper, Lyytinen and King argue (p. 226):  “There are many legitimate 
academic fields…that have no theoretic core.”  Again, their line of argument is contrary 
to premise (1), because it makes sense only in the context of a theoretical core being a 
sufficient condition for academic legitimacy (the converse of premise (1)).  Subsequently, 
Lyytinen and King also argue (p. 226):  “The presence of a theoretic core can sometimes 
be useful in establishing or sustaining legitimacy, but it is unsound to argue that having a 
theoretical core is necessary (my emphasis) for this purpose.”  Lyytinen and King’s 
premise (1) does not state that having a theoretical core is a necessary condition for 
academic legitimacy.  Rather, it states that having a theoretical core is a sufficient 
condition for academic legitimacy (Figure 1, upper left-hand quadrant). 
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In short, Lyytinen and King give inconsistent representations of the premises and 
arguments supposedly made by scholars who contend that the IS discipline needs a 
theoretical core.  As a result, their first syllogism is not a valid formulation of one of these 
representations. 
 
Confusion About the Notion of a Complementary Syllogism 
 
Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) claim that their syllogisms (1), (2), and (3), and (1b), 
(2b), and (3b) are “complementary.”  I am unclear about the meaning they ascribe to a 
complementary syllogism.  The formula ¬TC(x) ⇒ ¬AL(x), where ¬TC(x) means a 
discipline does not have a theoretical core and ¬AL(x) means a discipline does not have 
academic legitimacy, is normally called the contrapositive of AL(x) ⇒ TC(x), and the first 
formula is logically equivalent to the second (Figure 1, upper right-hand quadrant).  On 
the other hand, in general ¬TC(x) ⇒ ¬AL(x)  and TC(x) ⇒ AL(x) have no obvious 
connection (see upper diagrams of Figure 1). 
 
Recall that Lyytinen and King’s major premise (1) entails that: 
 
• Whenever a discipline has a theoretical core, it will also have academic 
legitimacy. 
• A discipline might have academic legitimacy even though it does not have a 
theoretical core. 
 
Note, however, that their major premise (1b) entails that: 
 
• Whenever a discipline does not have a theoretical core, it will also not have 
academic legitimacy. 
• A discipline might not have academic legitimacy even though it has a 
theoretical core. 
 
These two major premises provide the foundation for two quite distinct arguments.  The 
first supports Lyytinen and King’s argument that academic disciplines can have 
legitimacy without a theoretical core.  Ironically, the second supports the arguments 
made by some scholars who contend that the IS discipline needs a theoretical core–
specifically, having a theoretical core is a necessary condition for a discipline to have 
legitimacy.  Note the contrary implications of the two premises.  The first says that 
academic legitimacy will always be present whenever a discipline has a theoretical core.  
The second allows that academic legitimacy may not be present whenever a discipline 
has a theoretical core. 
 
Confusion about the Logical Fallacy of Denying the Consequent 
 
Recall that Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 225) state:  “The problem, however, comes with 
syllogisms [sic] (1b), (2b), and (3b), which the core theory assumes–called the logical 
fallacy of denying the consequent.”  Unfortunately, the nature of the “problem” they 
perceive is unclear. 
 
From one perspective, it is unclear whether Lyytinen and King are referring to the first or 
the second (or both) of their “complementary syllogisms” when they claim that the logical 
fallacy of denying the consequent has been committed.  If it applies to their first 
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syllogism, it entails the following argument (which is fallacious):  If a discipline does not 
have legitimacy (denial of the consequent), then it does not have a theoretical core.  
Given they have stated in major premise (1) that legitimacy is a necessary condition for 
having a theoretical core, of course the possibility exists, therefore, that a discipline does 
not have legitimacy but may still have a theoretical core–hence the fallacious argument. 
 
From another perspective, if the fallacy applies to the second syllogism, it entails the 
following argument:  If a discipline has academic legitimacy, it has a theoretical core.  As 
I have argued above, some proponents of the need for a theoretical core would indeed 
reach this conclusion, but it would not be on the basis of committing the fallacy of 
denying the consequent in relation to Lyytinen and King’s second syllogism.  Rather, it 
would be on the basis of their affirming the antecedent in Lyytinen and King’s second 
syllogism (a valid form of argument). 
 
Curiously, in their subsequent sentence (p. 225), Lyytinen and King then state 
(presumably in relation to their first syllogism):  “This suggests that a lack of legitimacy 
results from a lack of a strong theoretical core, and thus from the denial of the 
antecedent (theoretical core, modus ponens) the denial of the consequence (legitimacy) 
can be inferred.”  Of course, this is the fallacy of denying the antecedent.  It seems they 
are making this argument as a basis for refuting major premise (1b), because they then 
state (p. 225):  “The chain (1b), (2b), and (3b) cannot be entailed from (1), (2), and (3), 
and is a logical fallacy.  … Accusation (1b),‘The lack of intellectual core implies lack of 
legitimacy,’ cannot be logically derived from accusation (1) ‘A strong theoretic core 
confers legitimacy,’ rendering (2b) and (2c) inconsistent.”  They are correct in saying that 
accusation (1b) cannot be derived from accusation (1) (see the upper diagrams in Figure 
1).  Indeed, as I have pointed out above, their two syllogisms present different 
arguments.  More to the point, however, their second syllogism is not a correct 
representation of the arguments made by at least some of those who support the need 
for a core in the IS discipline. 
 
Lyytinen and King also comment somewhat dismissively (p. 225):  “The claim that the 
lack of a theoretical core deprives IS of legitimacy is invalid, and not worth further 
consideration.”  Even if we accept their claims about false premises and false 
arguments, the conclusion that “lack of a theoretical core deprives IS of legitimacy” could 
still be true!  In logic, a conclusion can be true even if the premises are false and the 
argument is invalid TPF7FPT.  For instance, consider the following:  If the moon is made of 
marshmallow, the sun shone somewhere on the earth today.  Here the conclusion is 
true, even if the major premise is false. 
 
Lyytinen and King’s confusion about the validity of premises and arguments also leads 
them to wrong conclusions.  For instance, they state (p. 241):  “In its strongest form, the 
theoretical core argument draws on fallacious reasoning.”  Nowhere have they shown 
that the reasoning is fallacious.  Rather, they have questioned the validity of the 
premises and not the reasoning.  Their inconsistent and sometimes incorrect 
representation of the premises, however, undermines the merits of their arguments. 
 
                                                 
TP
7
PT  More precisely, the argument is a fallacy. 
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Still one more time!  The criticality of definitions and premises 
 
I have argued elsewhere (Weber, 2006, pp. 296-297) that evaluating the validityTPF8FPT of 
arguments about the need for a theoretical core in the IS discipline depends on the 
following matters: 
 
• Providing precise definitions of constructs such as “discipline,” “identity,” 
“academic legitimacy,” and “theoretical core.” 
• Evaluating the validity of premises. 
• Evaluating the validity of arguments. 
 
In relation to the first matter, surprisingly, Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 223) claim:  “… 
none of the commentaries about the IS discipline’s need for a theoretical core have 
articulated exactly what is meant by the term ‘theoretical core,’ a point acknowledged by 
Weber (2003).”  I have re-read my editorial several times, and nowhere can I see that I 
“acknowledge” this point.  On the contrary, in Weber (2006, pp. 296-297), I refer to 
several places where I have tried to define the notion of “core” precisely. 
 
In relation to the validity of premises, Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 226) claim:  “There are 
many legitimate academic disciplines that can be characterized by their focus of study, 
by the methods their members use, by the tendencies in their opinions or findings, and 
by their impact on the thinking of those outside their discipline, but they have no 
theoretical core:  classics, German literature, accounting, and history, to name a few.”  In 
short, they are disputing the validity of major premise (1b) by finding a counter-example 
(disciplines that are legitimate but do not have a core).  Indeed, they are arguing for the 
validity of major premise (1) above that they articulated, which allows for the possibility of 
a discipline having academic legitimacy even though it does not have a theoretical core. 
 
I applaud this turn in their arguments, because it allows us to sharpen the focus of our 
debate.  My response is that some proponents of the need for a theoretical core would 
disagree that classics, German literature, accounting, and history are “legitimate” 
academic disciplines.  In this regard, I know one of these disciplines reasonably well–
namely, the accounting discipline.  Other proponents of the need for a theoretical core 
would argue that Lyytinen and King’s counter-example misses the point of their 
arguments because their focus is the clarity of disciplinary identity and not academic 
legitimacy. 
 
In any event, the debate needs to focus now on what the protagonists mean by 
“discipline” and “legitimacy” and, for my part, the nature of disciplinary identity and the 
nature of some particular disciplines that are usually found within humanities and arts 
faculties in tertiary institutions.  In addition, the protagonists need to debate the validity of 
                                                 
TP
8
PT  I point out in Weber (2006, p. 299) that Lyytinen and King (2004, p. 223) distinguish 
between the validity and soundness of an argument.  Validity refers to the correctness of 
the logic.  Soundness refers to the truth of the premises.  Using their terminology, a valid 
argument may have untrue premises.  In this paper (as in Weber 2006), I use the term 
“validity” to apply to both the correctness of the logic and the truth of the premises.  More 
precisely, the term “fallacy” applies only to the question of whether the logic is correct. 
See the entry “fallacy” in The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2001, at 
http://www.bartleby.com/65/fa/fallacy.html. 
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premises and arguments.  For the moment, however, this debate must await another 
forum. 
 
In relation to the validity of arguments, the test to be undertaken is whether the 
consequent follows from the premises and the rules of logic.  Nonetheless, I have 
pointed out earlier that Lyytinen and King reach an erroneous conclusion because in 
logic a conclusion can be true even if the premises are false and the argument is a 
fallacy.  Thus, protagonists in the debate about the need for a theoretical core in the IS 
discipline need to take care when evaluating the validity of arguments.  Untrue premises 
and fallacious arguments do not always mean that conclusions are untrue. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
In my rebuttal of some of Lyytinen and King’s (2004) claims in this paper, I have sought 
to show how logic-of-the-core contributions to the debate about the need for a theoretical 
core in the IS discipline force protagonists to confront areas of agreement and 
disagreement directly.  In a logic-of-the-core exchange, protagonists have little 
alternative but to define key terms and state critical premises and arguments more 
precisely.  As the exchange unfolds, therefore, they should be able to pinpoint where 
they agree or differ.  In some cases, they may also find good reasons to change their 
minds (which should be a welcome outcome in scholarly discourse!). 
 
It is also important that protagonists in the debate strive to state premises and 
arguments correctly and consistently.  In this regard, I have shown that some of Lyytinen 
and King’s (2004) formalizations of the premises underlying the arguments made by 
other protagonists in the debate are incorrect.  I have also shown that Lyytinen and King 
are making different arguments at different places in their paper.  An unfortunate 
outcome is obfuscation rather than clarity in the debate. 
 
In a sequel to their paper, King and Lyytinen (2004, p. 539) argue that “greatness comes 
not from holding tight to what we can grasp, but rather from our willingness to reach 
beyond what we can grasp.” TPF9FPT  Their view is that those who continue to “grasp” for a 
theoretical core in the IS discipline will undermine the possibility of “greatness” in the 
discipline.  I hold a different view.  “What we can grasp” with relative ease are reference-
discipline theories, phenomena associated with the latest information technologies, 
consolation for our “anxiety discourse” in rhetoric about the youthfulness of our field, 
appeals for the legitimacy of methodological pluralism, and so on.  What is difficult to 
grasp–that which extends our reach–is the core of the IS discipline.  Therein lies the 
possibility of “greatness.”  We must take care that the things we can now grasp with 
relative ease ultimately do not leave us with an empty hand. 
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